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Abstract 
 
The adaptation of market segmentation to political communication is identified here 
as a neglected explanation for why young people often figure in popular political 
debates as both the cause and symptom of declining social values and civic 
participation. New media also contribute to public anxiety because they enable new 
forms of mediated civic engagement and disrupt the capacity of transmission media to 
bind nations. Declining engagement with news media is used as an index of young 
peoples’ lack of civic-mindedness but, as research surveyed and reported here shows, 
this trend away from orthodox news forms is apparent across all age groups, not just 
youth. This article makes the case for public debate, informed by research that 
addresses the substantive problems of transforming democracy.   
  
 
Introduction  
There is widespread concern in many Western democracies that engagement with 
traditional politics, including voting, party membership and civic participation, is in 
decline. These patterns are even more pronounced when one looks at young people 
(Dahlgren 2007, 1–2; Dahlgren and Olsson 2008, 495–6; Bennett 2007, 59). The 
decline in civic engagement is repeatedly attributed to changing social “values”. 
Youth and media (particularly news media) are also repeatedly identified in public 
debates as causal factors, with declining news consumption amongst young people 
interpreted as a symptom and source of the apparent erosion of values and citizenship 
(Evans and Sternberg 1999; PANPA 1995). Updated evidence-based research into 
youth media consumption in Australia is an important and much-needed addition to 
existing studies to better understand the phenomenon of youth civic engagement 
alongside changing patterns of media use and broad social and political 
transformations. This paper contributes to this project by drawing on recent 
international research, and preliminary results from a pilot investigation of the role of 
new media in the ‘values’ systems of Australian youth, to examine the main 
explanations offered for declining levels of news media use by young people. First we 
undertake a critical overview of academic literature and Australian public debates 
about civic (dis)engagement and note the recurrent emphasis (particularly during 
election campaigns) on youth, news media and values. We pay particular attention to 
the role of market segmentation as a factor in civic disengagement.  
 
Media-centred explanations of youth civic disengagement focus on two main 
problems in wider social and cultural contexts: changes in youth media consumption, 
especially of news; and problems of representation of youth in and by media. Young 
people have less interest in traditional news media and forms of civic participation. 
Their media consumption patterns also differ significantly to those of older citizens. 
Youth turn off media that are perceived as irrelevant or negative. Niche media, new 
media and proliferating entertainment choices complicate this trend. These trends are 
interdependent and shaped by a range of other factors. For example, social policies 
that extend the period of economic and physical dependence (on parents for financial 
support and transport, for instance) also shape the local and online geographies and 
forms of youth civic engagement (Harris and Wyn 2009). This interdependence is 
illustrated and developed here by first considering how the phenomenon of youth 
civic disengagement has figured in recent election debates. This analysis develops 
earlier work that links these shifts in media use to the ways that young people are 
‘constructed as political objects’ (Evans and Sternberg 1999) in market research 
discourses of and about voter attitudes and values.  
 
Finally, this work is located within an emerging consensus that a major shift is 
occurring in forms of civic participation. This acknowledges that conventional notions 
of political engagement need revision in order to reveal the many active, although far 
from uniform, practices of youth engagement (Phillips and Moroz 1996). Two starting 
points considered here are provided by Couldry, Livingstone and Markham’s (2007, 
3) idea of ‘public connection’, by which they mean a shared orientation to a public 
world where matters of shared concern can be addressed, and Silverstone’s (2007) 
concept of the ‘mediapolis’.   
  
Marketing, politics, and the focus on ‘youth’  
The political value of marketing first became apparent nearly a century ago. By the 
1920s in the US  it was clear that people could be united politically in the same way a 
consumer base could be built for specific commodities (Graham & Luke 2003). 
Political opinion polling, first successfully conducted on a nationwide scale by the 
Literary Digest in the US in 1916 (Squire 1988), gave the first indications that 
demographics were at issue in measuring the predictability of human behavior. For 
the first time, the Literary Digest polls failed to predict a political winner in 1936, 
with the Gallup poll achieving more accurate predictions from a much smaller but 
demographically representative population (Squire 1988). The idea of demographics 
first gave mass communicators an indication that different segments of a population 
would respond differently to messages (Squire 1988). Demographics therefore 
became a “segmentation” strategy for marketers of commodities, with the rise in 
popularity of “lifestyle” magazines in the 1960s providing new forms of print media 
for the actualization of such strategies (Gensch & Welam 1973). By the late-1980s, 
the last vestiges of stable and predictable demographic behaviors, and of relatively 
stable mass audiences, began to give way to new methods of marketing made possible 
by increasingly sophisticated data storage and manipulation technologies: databases 
(Goss, 1995). At that point, marketing strategy ‘shifted from the promotion of 
homogeneous products in mass markets through the mass media to the promotion of 
highly differentiated product lines to particular niche markets’ (Goss 2005, 173). This 
process of demographic differentiation by marketers has led to finer and finer 
segmentation strategies through analyses of psychographics (Robertson & Wind 
1980), geography (Goss 1995), lifestyle (Robertson & Wind 1980), media use (Prior 
2005), and values (Novak & MacEvoy 1990; Kakamura & Mazzon 1991).  
 
It is against this history of marketing communication that the focus on youth has 
emerged as one of the most striking features of public political discourses on 
changing citizenship and values since the 1980s and 90s when youth were referred to 
as ‘Generation X’ and the idea of generation-based audiences or citizens became 
firmly entrenched within popular discourse (Sternberg 1998). Public concern about 
citizen formation has since focused on those groups perceived as not (yet) having full 
citizen status, “would-be” citizens or citizens in formation.  Youth in particular are 
singled out as a problematic cohort who exemplify and contribute to the trend towards 
declining national cohesion (Evans and Sternberg 1999; Arvanitakis and Marren 
2009; Tilton 2010). They are associated with emerging and future social trends, and 
are seen as a gauge of society’s successes or failures. Their practices and preferences, 
such as disinterest in civic institutions and news media, are seen to anticipate and 
articulate emergent trends. This emphasis on youth also serves a strategic purpose: 
citizens are addressed as guardians of values, aligned with political leaders or the 
media, unified in opposition to youth (the other). More widespread disengagement 
and political alienation is concealed, and complex social, economic and political 
issues that are linked with the broader crisis in citizenship and political agency are 
masked. While the focus here is on youth, it is important to note that other groups are 
also targeted (such as asylum seekers, migrants and unemployed), people whose 
status as citizens is widely perceived as illegitimate or incomplete (Briskman, Latham 
and Goddard 2009).   
 
Anxiety about youth values is especially pronounced in the context of political 
elections and debates about social cohesion and citizenship (Howard 2004). 
Marketing methods that produce knowledge of consumers’ “values” and attitudes 
have increasingly been used by politicians and political parties to define and target 
citizens (albeit in conjunction with other markers such as geographical location, age, 
gender, race/ethnicity, education and socio-economic status). For example, in 
Australia, Roy Morgan’s ‘Values Segments’ (Roy Morgan n.d.),  which are widely 
used in media and marketing industries, are also used in the development of political 
campaigns to ensure the mass appeal of messages that work to manufacture common 
ground, or shared values, across significant (in terms of influence and size) ‘Values 
Segment’ groups. By identifying certain “others”, particularly youth, as the source of 
problems of citizen formation, the election tactic of appealing across Values 
Segments has been successfully used to legitimate the sense of entitlement of citizens 
who share ‘Australian values’ and an ‘Australian' way of life. 
 
Declining use of market-led news by young people Another distinctive feature of public political debate on changing values and civic engagement is the emphasis on the media’s role in the formation of young people’s values. A strong causal connection is assumed; for better or for worse the media plays a significant role in shaping youth values. It is seen in the mass media model as a powerful one-way force responsible for contributing to declining values, distracting youth from civic responsibilities, either by engaging them too much, or failing to educate youth and not engaging them enough.   
 
The relationship between media consumption and civic engagement is complex. 
Claims that the public sphere is in decline, hastened by changing media and patterns 
of use, tend to privilege a traditional conception of the public sphere that sees politics 
expressed primarily through mainstream media and party politics and modern agenda-
setting media such as newspapers. Underlying this view is the assumption that 
coherence of the nation and its political system is dependent upon the majority of 
citizens sharing common information and values of national identity. Media and 
audience fragmentation, the proliferation of new platforms and channels, and diverse 
patterns of use threaten civic engagement and the shared imaginary of the nation 
(Turow 1997, 248). So too do declining audiences for news (Leigh 2010). 
  
Simons (2007, 34–35) argues that mainstream news media audiences are declining as 
a consequence of reduced diversity of content and hence choice, despite the expansion 
of new media outlets. She expects this trend will intensify as the age of the ‘media 
emperors’, such as Kerry Packer and Rupert Murdoch, passes and their empires are 
taken over by ‘anonymous stock-market investors’ (2007, 50). Already, the major 
networks and newspapers concentrate on the ‘national’ and capital cities, a trend that 
has increased with syndicated feeds for news and sport. Others (Keen 2007) argue 
conversely that people manage the sheer diversity of online information by seeking 
out only that content which fits with their own views. This also has implications for 
community coherence, as the power of media hold nations together with shared 
stories, conversations, and values, weakens (80–83).  
 
Concerns about the impact of media on values relate to the amount of time youth 
spend with media. As Critcher (2008) demonstrates, social ‘authorities’ have long 
been suspicious of the deleterious effects of mass media on young people. Critcher 
says, ‘it is difficult to avoid the impression that, for these and many other media 
critics, they would really prefer children to eschew all media and sit down to read a 
good book’ (97). There are also ‘values’ concerns about media content, forms and 
formats, which centre on the perceived ‘tabloidisation’ (Turner 1999) or ‘dumbing 
down’ (Couldry, Livingstone and Markham 2007) of news and current affairs, 
assumed to be the most important genres for the construction of a public sphere. This 
work identifies the increasing tendency to treat political coverage as an adversarial 
clash rather than a discussion of policies; it also highlights an increasing focus on the 
personalities and private lives of public figures rather than on social issues. Part of 
this ‘personalization of politics’ is associated with a blurring of the genres of ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ news and the widespread use of conversational style in news and current 
affairs interviews that privilege personal experience as the basis of credibility (Tolson 
2006). These developments are viewed as trivializing traditional conceptions of 
politics and the public sphere. The answer, according to this viewpoint, is for 
politicians and the media to deal more substantively with issues rather than 
personalities. Yet this is not necessarily a universal solution. Some research indicates 
that many citizens prefer to have only just enough information to enable them to make 
quick and relatively easy character assessments and decisions rather than more 
detailed and comprehensive coverage of issues that would require them to consider 
different debates and engage critically with policy positions (Lipsitz, Trost, Grossman 
and Sides 2005). Education, age, gender and ethnicity all seem to be influential 
factors here, with younger, educated and politically involved people showing a 
preference for more muscular information. 
 
Further links between civic disengagement and market segmentation are also relevant 
to this discussion. Prior (2005, 579) argues that in the context of channel proliferation 
and audience fragmentation, commercial news suppliers have responded by treating 
news in two distinct ways: first and largely as niche entertainment offerings, 
appealing to specific audience tastes, or second, as factual, accurate and in-depth 
‘serious’ news. This, he argues, is a response to consumer preferences and results in a 
widening ‘knowledge gap’ about politics, and a consequent engagement with politics, 
between those who watch news for entertainment and those who watch news for 
serious civic engagement. Prior hypothesizes (578) that ‘people's media environment 
determines the extent to which their media use is governed by content preferences’. 
By media environment, he means the number of channel choices available in a given 
context. Relevant to our argument here, Prior’s data suggests that the net result of a 
personalized media environment is that ‘greater media choice leads to greater 
voluntary segmentation of the electorate’, a situation that is bound to increase political 
disengagement because ‘the likelihood of "chance encounters" with any political 
content declines significantly for many people (pp. 577-578). 
 
New media and the declining use of news media by young people  
The correlation between proliferating media and increased amounts of time young 
people spend with media is now being registered in media usage research. Between 
2004 and 2009 the amount of time young Americans spent with media dramatically 
increased from six hours and 21 minutes per day to seven hours and 38 minutes, 
‘largely due to greater access to and use of mobile and online media, as well as multi-
tasking behavior’. Young Americans now spend nearly twice as much time using 
media as their Australian counterparts. Television remains the dominant form in both 
places. In 2007 broadcast television accounted for approximately 78 percent (two 
hours and 26 minutes per day) of total media activity of Australian children and 
young people (ACMA 2010, 1-2). On-demand platforms such as DVDs, iPods, the 
Internet and mobiles accounted for the balance. Young Americans spent two hours 
and 39 minutes on average with live television but this represents only 59% of their 
overall media activity. A similar dramatic increase in the amount of time young 
Australians commit to media has not yet been detected, but this is tentatively regarded 
as a delay rather than a departure from the trends now apparent among American 
youth, attributed to the fact that American new media markets are larger and more 
developed (ACMA 2010).   
 
Australian research has found that the Internet is used to access news far less 
frequently than it is used to access entertainment, search engines and emails (Ang et 
al. 2006). This finding holds across all age groups and challenges the youth focus of 
public ‘values’ debates. Nonetheless young people appear to be consuming less news 
(Ang et al. 2006). Recent Australian and international reesarch offers two main 
explanations for this. One is that news is diluted by a more general increase in media 
consumption associated with new media (ACMA 2010). Another is that young people 
are turning away from modern news forms in response to perceived 
misrepresentations of young people (Ang et al. 2006; Wayne et. al. 2010; Sternberg 
1998).  
 
This is not to say that news and current affairs have no influence on young people.  A 
recent Australian study of the impact of news reportage on youth attitudes to illicit 
drugs concluded that public relations activity to increase news media coverage of 
health and social harm risks may be more influential than advertising or social 
marketing campaigns, both in terms of cost and impact on attitudes towards illicit 
drug use (Hughes, Spicer, Lancaster and Matthew-Simmons 2010, 7). Even though 
research participants were skeptical about the truth-telling capacity of journalists, they 
were also ‘highly aware that media has differential impacts on young people’s 
attitudes to drugs’. Based on an extensive content analysis of news coverage of illicit 
drugs, researchers concluded that ‘in the main the Australian news media is likely to 
be having a deterrent effect on youth’ (Hughes et al. 2010, 6). In an atmosphere where 
news media have a growing dependence on public relations for content, these 
researchers concluded that Australian health promotion agencies would be well-
advised to follow the lead of law-enforcement agencies into PR-based media 
advocacy because ‘news coverage of illicit drug issues is highly pervasive, continuous 
and cheap’ (Hughes et. al. 2010: 6-7).  
 
Positive depictions of young people may prove to be crucial to the success of PR-
centred communication strategies if they are to gain traction with these segments. UK 
research found news to be particularly disproportionately negative in its depiction of 
young people. The ‘demonisation’ of young people in the news has a long history 
(Wayne et al. 2010, 185–219). From the Second World War until the 1980s, negative 
media attention has focused on subcultural groups. Since the 1980s, the trend has 
been towards representation of young people as a generalized threat, represented as 
either ‘youth in trouble’ or ‘youth as trouble’. Such representations are one side of a 
two-sided coin in a broader culture that positions young people either as cutting- edge 
consumers and fashion leaders or as problems within a law and order framework 
(2010, 108). Where young people are represented positively in news and current 
affairs, it is overwhelmingly in coverage of sports stars or celebrities (2008; 2010). 
Both representations have the effect of marginalizing young women (2010, 109).  
 
Ang et al. (2006) also found cynicism towards news. Far from assisting young people 
to engage with political issues as citizens, news left them feeling disconnected and 
disempowered, unable to find meaning or a sense of place in mainstream news media. 
They felt disillusioned with their inability to affect issues that they felt were important 
to them. They sought to ‘tune out’ with entertainment. However, these authors, too, 
concluded that, ‘these negative attitudes towards the news media and the events they 
describe are largely the result of the way the news media covers issues, not any 
inherent apathy on the part of younger Australians’ (2006, 55). Ang et al. concur with 
findings from other studies that news and current affairs media, and the form of 
modern party politics, fail to engage young people and provide them with the 
resources needed to foster critical engagement with political and social issues, even 
when young people themselves have strong interests in many social issues of 
relevance to them as citizens (Ang et al. 2006; Buckingham 2000; Fahmy 2006; 
Wayne et al. 2010). 
 
The studies considered above provide a context for interpreting early findings of our 
own study of ‘New Media Voices in the Australian Values Debate’. This research 
surveys the values and media usage of Year 10 students in Queensland (usual age 14-
15 years), together with their parents and teachers. A pilot study of media uses and 
preferences was conducted in a medium-sized co-educational non-state secondary 
school located in the urban southeastern coastal strip in August 2010. It involved 20 
students, 4 parents and 24 teachers as survey respondents. Participants were recruited 
through the school, and given time out of their normal classes to do the online survey. 
A small number of students completed the survey at home, as did all of the parents. A 
teacher supervised the class, but did not otherwise instruct the students in relation to 
the survey during administration. A researcher was on hand to answer queries 
regarding the survey questions. The survey consisted of questions on students’ values 
and media use, most rated on a 7 point Likert scale. News consumption did not form 
the focus of any particular question but was included as an option in a number of 
questions regarding preferred programs in different media. Students were also asked 
how much time they spent using a variety of media, which they thought were 
important influences on their values and worldview, and where they went first for 
information on a number of topics. Feedback from the pilot study was used to inform 
revisions of the survey instrument for the main study.  
 
Class may yet emerge as an important variable in our study, but for now gender 
accounts for the most significant differences across the sample. Girls indicated greater 
use of newspapers as did female teachers. TV news and current affairs programs were 
not hugely popular among the young people surveyed, but nor were they entirely 
unpopular, with three-quarters of students giving them a better than neutral rating. 
Parents, on the other hand, rated TV news and current affairs program more positively. 
Current affairs TV magazine content was more popular with girls and was their most 
preferred type of magazine content. Talkback radio was more popular among students 
than conventional radio news and current affairs programming. 
 
Importantly, the Internet was not highly valued as a source of news, but it was very 
highly regarded as a source for other kinds of information for all groups. Boys rated 
parents and friends as more important information sources than the Internet. 
Workmates, teachers, radio and TV were ranked about the same as the Internet. Girls 
rated their parents as a more important sources of information, but rated the Internet 
alongside friends, teachers, TV and newspapers. Even though students claimed 
parents and friends were among their most important information sources, when 
asked where they would go first to find information on a range of specific questions, 
they more often nominated the Internet. The exception seemed to be personal matters 
such as education and career advice and, for girls, health issues. Over three-quarters 
of respondents said the Internet was the most important influence on their view of the 
world. Respondents seemed to engage in more localized, identity-based forms of civic 
culture and participation, irrespective of gender or role (i.e., student, teacher or 
parent).  
 
Because it was not primarily about news and citizenship the pilot survey did not 
encourage respondents to reproduce the civic discourses they have learnt are 
appropriate responses to such questioning (Buckingham 2000). However, it also 
meant that we did not generate a lot of detail on how respondents approached news, 
other than it was clear that news was not the preferred content of any media about 
which we asked. The findings also suggested that lower youth consumption of 
conventional mainstream news media is not adequately explained by increased use of 
new media. Given the small sample, this pilot study cannot be considered a major 
contribution to the field. However, it does produce some interesting preliminary 
findings that tentatively confirm patterns in earlier work. Consistent with earlier work 
by Ang et al. (2006), Young (2009) and ACMA (2010). These students, parents and 
teachers do not appear to be substituting print or broadcast news media with online 
media. Indeed, students and adults, who have a preference for news will access it 
regardless of platform, and those who are not interested are not persuaded to develop 
one simply because they can access it through new technologies.  
 Media, public connection and civic engagement 
A large multi-dimensional study by Couldry, Livingstone and Markham found that 
for most people, media consumption contributed to their sense of ‘public connection’ 
(2007, 75). However, on its own, this did not necessarily lead to political or civic 
engagement as few people in their study actually had opportunity for ‘effective 
deliberation or public action’ (188). This led the authors to conclude that the problem 
was not so much an absolute decline in political interest, or indeed public connection, 
but a lack of articulation between what governments and other public bodies ‘do or 
think and what citizens do or think’ (189). Crucially, Couldry et al. (2007, 394) argue 
that for political engagement to be meaningful people must feel that their voices are 
being heard. Dean (2008) probes the reasons why people feel they are not heard at 
precisely the moment when resources for participation in a global polity have never 
been more abundant. She argues that in contemporary capitalism, communication has 
been detached from ideals of belonging and connection, functions as the foundation of 
capitalist production, not democratic politics. Networked communications may well 
improve the capacity for new voices to be heard through varied and widespread 
participation in content creation, but this activity does not require a response, even if 
one is demanded.  
 
Democratic action in everyday life emerges as an essential ingredient in political and 
civic engagement. How this might be realized is vastly expanded along the continuum 
of consumer-citizenship and e-democracy in a digital media environment. The media, 
including the Internet, can facilitate engagement but are unlikely to initiate it 
(Dahlgren and Olsson 2008, 496–497). Political engagement is dependent on 
participation in what Dahlgren and Olsson call ‘civic cultures,’ which they define as 
‘resources, storehouses of assets which individuals and groups draw upon and make 
use of in their activities as citizens’ (2008, 497). Media have an impact on civic 
cultures (Dahlgren and Olsson 2008, 497) including youth cultures. Indeed, Dahlgren 
and Olsson found in their study of politically engaged young people in Sweden that 
those involved in mainstream politics used email and internet resources in ways that 
mirrored the face-to-face structure of their organizations; and the Internet was the 
‘glue’ that held together members of alternative political movements (2008, 504). 
 
Local circumstances, including the impacts of social policy, also have a considerable 
bearing upon the shape of civic youth culture. Harris and Wyn (2009) observe that the 
physical movement and activities of a majority of fifteen to seventeen year olds are 
highly constrained due to dependence on their families for financial support and 
transport, government policies that require them to remain in education or training, 
and intense surveillance in public spaces (2009, 327). Consequently, most young 
people are immersed in mundane and highly localised civic cultures that shape their 
social networks and everyday opportunities for positioning themselves as political. 
They are far-removed from ‘the popular portrayal of young people “today” as citizens 
of global communities’ (Harris and Wyn 2009, 333). Although they feel powerless in 
relation to formal politics, they often take political action when they are able to 
localise broader concerns, and use the Internet to discuss political issues of 
importance to them. This kind of engagement has primarily been achieved through 
social networking sites rather than the conventional sites of formal politics (2009, 
338–339). Macnamara (2008) similarly argues that people engage with the public 
sphere at many levels and in many different ways. Political spoofs and parodies on the 
Internet and television, and even commentary on blogs and websites, are important 
new forms and avenues of civic engagement (2008, 11–16).  
 
Dahlgren and Olsson investigate the argument that a proliferation of extra-
parliamentary social campaigns and the rise of ‘advocacy or issue politics’ (Dahlgren 
and Olsson 2008, 494–495) are evidence that democracy itself is in transition. They 
attribute this type of politics to the way that young people learn to formulate their 
identities via a process that they describe as ‘reflexive biographization’. They argue 
this results in ‘processes of individualization’ that create resistance to authority, 
external control, collective solutions and institutional loyalty. Identity is ‘shaped 
increasingly via consumption, leisure and popular culture’ (2008, 496) and is made all 
the more accessible and malleable by new media. Bennett describes these alternative 
political movements in terms of ‘the self-actualising citizen’ who sees his or her 
‘political activities and commitments in highly personal terms that contribute more to 
enhancing the quality of personal life, social recognition, self esteem or friendship 
relations, than to understanding, support, and involvement in government’ (2007, 62).  
 
Some of the more utopian views about new media and citizenship tend to conflate 
identity with politics and to confuse self-expression with political effectiveness. The 
latter requires collective action, which runs counter to individualized cultures of 
consumption. Also problematic is the optimistic view that new media open the 
opportunity to form connections on a global scale (Dean 2008). While this is certainly 
possible, it ignores evidence that, for most people, online networks are an extension 
of existing offline ones and effective political action is frequently locally based.  
 
Many of the positions outlined above assume either that media consumption 
influences civic engagement or that pre-existing engagement is expressed through 
media products. One problem with this continuum is the presumption that media use 
and civic engagement are seen as separate domains of activity. In positioning the 
consumer at the beginning and end points of political engagement, serious 
investigation of the ways people engage through media is foreclosed. This can range 
from actively ignoring politics to producing dialogical media content, a practice well-
illustrated by YouTube, where members create and upload videos in response to those 
posted by other members (Burgess and Green 2009).  
 
Silverstone (2007) counters this opposition of media consumption and political and 
civic engagement by emphasizing the ‘environmental’ ubiquity of the media. He 
argues that media are ‘tightly and dialectically intertwined with the everyday’ (2007, 
5), and uses the term ‘mediapolis’ to describe ‘the mediated public space where 
contemporary political life increasingly finds its place, both at national and global 
levels, and where the materiality of the world is constructed through (principally) 
electronically communicated public speech and action’ (2007, 31). He frames the 
problems of the ‘mediopolis’ in terms of media engagement, rather than media 
consumption or production, and positions media engagement and political 
engagement as imbricated: political engagement takes the form of political 
communication, as speaker or listener. However, in many instances, media fail to 
provide the resources necessary to foster this engagement. Far from encouraging 
critical thought and action, media foster passivity and a desire for comfort 
(Silverstone 2007, 134–35). The Internet and digital media make it easier to simply 
switch off those images which are unpalatable (2007, 138) or to view them as 
spectacle removed from political contexts. Corporate takeover of new media also 
inhibits effective functioning of the mediapolis (2007, 138).  
 
Concluding comments 
Growing disengagement with civic institutions is a serious matter for democratic 
societies, yet it is a phenomenon that remains under-researched and for the most part 
poorly understood. Much public debate locates the problem of civic (dis)engagement 
with youth and understands their differences in terms of (declining) values. Not only 
does this focus on youth have a long history in terms of social commentary, but it is 
aligned with developments in marketing segmentation. This knowledge of 
consumer/citizens’ attitudes and values has been widely adopted by business, 
marketing, political marketing and communication. Generational categories and the 
values ascribed to them are now routinely used in election campaigning to target non-
youth segments, appealing to their conservatism and uniting them in their sense of 
difference from youth. Hence, public debates about civic disengagement tend to focus 
on youth and fail to address the consequences of changing patterns of media use. 
These include increasingly diverse modes of engagement across social groups (young 
and old), whether that engagement (or disaffection) is with politics and the civic 
sphere, the media and the ‘mediapolis’, or a consumer society that fails to deliver the 
ideals it presents.  
 
Research challenges the view that youth are not interested in or engaged with politics. 
Concerns about political and social conditions are articulated by youth, albeit often in 
online chat and commentary which may not be monitored or understood as forms of 
civic engagement. Further research into these different forms of participation could 
provide significant insight into youth practices and preferences in relation to civics, 
while also suggesting future directions for fostering of civic engagement among the 
wider population. There is little evidence to support the assumption that new media 
contribute to youth disengagement. On the contrary, research shows that there are 
varied and emerging forms of mediated engagement with social and political issues 
amongst young people and increasingly amongst older citizens, some of which 
constitute civic engagement (or disaffection), and some of which may be linked with 
practices and notions of citizenship that are not yet fully articulated or understood.  
 
Research confirms that young people are less inclined to engage with traditional news 
sources and traditional civic institutions, and that this disinterest in news and politics 
among certain youth is not magically transformed when they engage with new media. 
It is evident that negative representations of youth in the news media (and in public 
debates about social policy) alienate youth from traditional news and media. Changes 
in the modes of address in news media, and increased awareness of (young) readers’ 
interests and needs, may help to reverse the decline of news consumption by youth 
and may equip them to participate more actively in civic debate. Certainly the media 
industries are adept at catering to segmented audiences. A detailed and nuanced 
understanding of particular niches and segments is crucial for governments and news 
media businesses seeking to address declining interest and civic participation. 
However, even if governments and news media succeed in forging inclusive ways of 
communicating in the mediapolis, the rhetoric of segmented communication strategies 
is likely to continue to feed the very conditions of (dis)engagement that party political 
protagonists mobilize in public ‘values’ debates and discourses.  
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